Imagination and the Experience of Moral Objectivity
Different notions of objectivity support different notions of what is required for a moral value or obligation to be experienced as objective. If the objectivity of a property (moral or otherwise) requires that it can exist even when we fail to notice its existence, then experiencing a property (mor...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2022
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2022, Volume: 25, Issue: 1, Pages: 37-51 |
| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCA Ethics VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Imagination
B Objectivity B Moral phenomenology B Independence |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Different notions of objectivity support different notions of what is required for a moral value or obligation to be experienced as objective. If the objectivity of a property (moral or otherwise) requires that it can exist even when we fail to notice its existence, then experiencing a property (moral or otherwise) as objective will require that we imagine it appearing in some way that is not presently available to us. Explaining what that imagining involves is the central task of this paper. Defending the epistemic value of such imagining is a secondary aim. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-021-10234-z |
