Interpersonal Comparison of Welfare Based on Harsanyi's Equiprobability Model for Moral Value Judgments

In 1953, and extended over the following two decades, John Harsanyi published a theorem suggesting that Bayesian rationality postulates together with interpersonal utility comparisons entail an average utilitarian theory. This article summarizes critique on key assumptions of his account. First, irr...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Gandjour, Afschin (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publié: 2021
Dans: Ethical perspectives
Année: 2021, Volume: 28, Numéro: 4, Pages: 385-416
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Harsanyi, John C. 1920-2000 / Avantage / Jugement moral / Prospérité (motif)
RelBib Classification:NCE Éthique des affaires
TK Époque contemporaine
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Résumé:In 1953, and extended over the following two decades, John Harsanyi published a theorem suggesting that Bayesian rationality postulates together with interpersonal utility comparisons entail an average utilitarian theory. This article summarizes critique on key assumptions of his account. First, irrational and antisocial preferences entail undesirable consequences. Second, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is a cardinal theory of utility. Third, rational, self-interested, and impartial parties choose acceptable moral principles. Fourth, the observer assigns an equal probability to all positions in society. Fifth, different observers have uniform extended preferences and no personal preferences. This summary is followed by a discussion of model extensions that aim at making welfare interpersonally comparable. These accounts are either based on Harsanyi’s original process of ‘imaginative empathy’ or a process of ‘deep imaginative empathy’, including a conceptualization based on life years in perfect utility.
ISSN:1783-1431
Contient:Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.2143/EP.28.4.3290394