Interpersonal Comparison of Welfare Based on Harsanyi's Equiprobability Model for Moral Value Judgments

In 1953, and extended over the following two decades, John Harsanyi published a theorem suggesting that Bayesian rationality postulates together with interpersonal utility comparisons entail an average utilitarian theory. This article summarizes critique on key assumptions of his account. First, irr...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:  
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Gandjour, Afschin (Verfasst von)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: HBZ Gateway
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Veröffentlicht: 2021
In: Ethical perspectives
Jahr: 2021, Band: 28, Heft: 4, Seiten: 385-416
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Harsanyi, John C. 1920-2000 / Nutzen / Moralisches Urteil / Wohlstand
RelBib Classification:NCE Wirtschaftsethik
TK Neueste Zeit
Online-Zugang: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In 1953, and extended over the following two decades, John Harsanyi published a theorem suggesting that Bayesian rationality postulates together with interpersonal utility comparisons entail an average utilitarian theory. This article summarizes critique on key assumptions of his account. First, irrational and antisocial preferences entail undesirable consequences. Second, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is a cardinal theory of utility. Third, rational, self-interested, and impartial parties choose acceptable moral principles. Fourth, the observer assigns an equal probability to all positions in society. Fifth, different observers have uniform extended preferences and no personal preferences. This summary is followed by a discussion of model extensions that aim at making welfare interpersonally comparable. These accounts are either based on Harsanyi’s original process of ‘imaginative empathy’ or a process of ‘deep imaginative empathy’, including a conceptualization based on life years in perfect utility.
ISSN:1783-1431
Enthält:Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.2143/EP.28.4.3290394