Interpreting the probabilities in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism

While much has been written about the probabilities referenced in Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how these probabilities are to be interpreted. In this paper, I demonstrate that objective interpretations entail the denial...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Neels, Gerrit (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2022
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Plantinga, Alvin 1932- / Probability / Evolution / Naturalism (Philosophy) / Cognition theory / Conviction / Objectivity / Bayes' rule
RelBib Classification:VA Philosophy
VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy
Further subjects:B Full and partial belief
B Defeaters
B Probability
B evolutionary argument against naturalism
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:While much has been written about the probabilities referenced in Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how these probabilities are to be interpreted. In this paper, I demonstrate that objective interpretations entail the denial of traditional theism, making them unsuitable for Plantinga’s purpose here. With respect to epistemic interpretations, I note that standard Bayesianism is too permissive for Plantinga’s purposes. I then argue that Plantinga’s use of the Principle of Indifference is at odds with his Reformed Epistemology. I conclude with some suggestions for how defenders of the argument might proceed.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09818-7