Evilism and the a priori

In this article, I respond to Stephen Law's evil god challenge (EGC) to traditional theism. I argue that while there are credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, there are no credible a priori grounds for believing that the first c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Religious studies
Main Author: Milburn, Joe (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press 2020
In: Religious studies
Year: 2021, Volume: 57, Issue: 4, Pages: 752-761
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B God / Evil / Theism
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
NBC Doctrine of God
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Summary:In this article, I respond to Stephen Law's evil god challenge (EGC) to traditional theism. I argue that while there are credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, there are no credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-evil. Because of this, theists have a reason for explaining away the a posteriori evidence against theism. The hypothetical evilist, on the other hand, does not. Thus, while the problem of the good makes it absurd to believe in evilism, the problem of evil does not make it absurd to believe in theism.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contains:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412520000074