COVID-19: the danger of blindly applying the "steepest curve"

Tirant enseignement de la première vague de Covid-19, et de la gestion de la pandémie par les autorités sanitaires françaises, cet article revient sur l’argument de la « plus grande pente » - argument qui consiste, dans une situation d’incertitude radicale, et par « précaution », à systématiquement...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal international de bioéthique et d'éthique des sciences
Authors: Ivasilevitch, Achille (Author) ; Stoeklé, Henri-Corto (Author) ; Ackermann, Félix (Author) ; Bizard, Antoine (Author) ; Hervé, Christian 1949- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Éditions ESKA 2021
In: Journal international de bioéthique et d'éthique des sciences
RelBib Classification:KBG France
NCH Medical ethics
Further subjects:B Coronavirus
B Disease outbreaks
B Épidémie
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Summary:Tirant enseignement de la première vague de Covid-19, et de la gestion de la pandémie par les autorités sanitaires françaises, cet article revient sur l’argument de la « plus grande pente » - argument qui consiste, dans une situation d’incertitude radicale, et par « précaution », à systématiquement projeter le pire. Pourtant, cette stratégie d’anticipation du plus grand mal est-elle pertinente pour gérer les crises ? Ce n’est pas ce que nous enseignent les pratiques, par lesquelles ont pu se dégager des pentes plus douces, des pentes « moyennes », découvertes au jour le jour à la lumière de l’expérience. Aussi cet article vise à défendre un autre paradigme dans la gestion de l’incertitude : à savoir celui d’une phronesis, d’une prudence guidée par les pratiques.
Since the time of the Irish philosopher Edmund Burke, who took pleasure in lifting, on the French Revolution, a true prophecy of doom [1], the steepest curve argument has repeatedly been used. In general, it consists of systematically adopting the bleakest predictions relating to an innovation, event or reform. In other words, it involves imagining a succession of consequences and calamities inevitably leading to a disaster, a catastrophe, either imminently or in the longer term. In this respect, it should be stressed that it is of little importance whether the threat is corroborated by scientific data or is simply an allegation of fact: because it is not the demonstration of a risk that causes concern - identifying that risk would already appease us -, but the radical nature of our uncertainty about what will happen, the total absence of knowledge that is unbearable. So, by "precaution", we always predict the worst-case scenario. But: is this rationale of anticipating the worst that might happen pertinent for dealing with crises? In our view, the experience of the "first wave" of COVID-19 illustrates the erroneous, and even potentially devastating nature, of this approach.Thus it was that, in France, right from the start of the pandemic, numerous rumors began to circulate. One such rumor circulating in hospital departments was that no COVID patient over the age of 75 years would survive mechanical ventilation in intensive care. It should be pointed out that this rumor had no solid basis in any study or data; it spread in a climate of anxiety, at a time at which the epidemic was starting to spread in the country…, Drawing lessons from the first wave of Covid-19, and the management of the pandemic by the French health authorities, this article questions the "steepest curve" argument -an argument that consists, in a situation of radical uncertainty, and by "precaution", in systematically projecting the worst-case scenario. But, is this rationale of anticipating the worst that might happen pertinent for dealing with crises? This is not what practices teach us, by which gentler slopes, "average" slopes, discovered day by day in the light of experience, have emerged. This article therefore aims to defend another paradigm in the management of uncertainty: that of a phronesis, a prudence guided by practices.
ISSN:2608-1008
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal international de bioéthique et d'éthique des sciences
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.3917/jibes.324.0151