"The metaphysical objection" and concurrentist co-operation

The foundation of W. Matthews Grant's project in Free Will and God's Universal Causality is his Non-Occasionalist version of Divine Universal Causality (NODUC), which affirms the traditional concurrentist idea that God and secondary causes cooperate non-superfluously in such a way that the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Religious studies
Subtitles:Special issue: "The Existence and Nature of Deities"
Main Author: Miller, Timothy David 1979- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press 2022
In: Religious studies
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Grant, W. Matthews / God / Causality / Simultaneousness / Occasionalism
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
NBC Doctrine of God
Further subjects:B NODUC
B Concurrentism
B co-operation
B Causation
B W. Matthews Grant
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Summary:The foundation of W. Matthews Grant's project in Free Will and God's Universal Causality is his Non-Occasionalist version of Divine Universal Causality (NODUC), which affirms the traditional concurrentist idea that God and secondary causes cooperate non-superfluously in such a way that they both produce the entire effect. Grant defends NODUC's concurrentist account by responding to ‘The Metaphysical Objection’, which alleges that concurrentism places an inconsistent set of demands upon secondary causes. I argue that Grant's responses to that objection are unconvincing, and thus, he fails to demonstrate that NODUC is a stable foundation for the rest of his project.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contains:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412521000287