Are there de jure objections to Mādhvic belief?
Recently, Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb have brought Madhva's epistemological framework into active dialogue with Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology and have argued that individuals within Madhva's tradition cannot make full use of Plantinga's epistemology, according to whi...
| Published in: | Religious studies |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2022
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| In: |
Religious studies
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Plantinga, Alvin 1932-
/ Mādhvas
/ Cognition theory
/ Theism
/ Justification (Philosophy)
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism BK Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism FA Theology |
| Further subjects: | B
Alvin Plantinga
B Mādhva B warrant B Reformed Epistemology B Vedanta |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Recently, Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb have brought Madhva's epistemological framework into active dialogue with Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology and have argued that individuals within Madhva's tradition cannot make full use of Plantinga's epistemology, according to which, Christian belief resists de jure objections and can also have warrant. While I do not contest this specific claim, I demonstrate that an analysis of Madhva's epistemological framework reveals that this framework has its own resources through which it can resist de jure objections. I address various objections to the rationality of Mādhvic belief and conclude that there are no de jure objections to Mādhvic belief that are independent of de facto objections. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412521000251 |