Skeptical theism and value judgments

One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Anderson, David James (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2012
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Further subjects:B All things considered value
B problem of evil
B Skeptical theism
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Parallel Edition:Electronic
Description
Summary:One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue that it is not problematic. I think that there is reason to question the implication itself. I begin by explaining the objection to skeptical theism and the standard response to it. I then identify an assumption that is prevalent in much of the literature concerning the problem of evil, and show that it is a factor in motivating commitment to the implication I mean to question. I argue that the assumption is false, and that once it is rejected there is room to endorse the skeptical theist’s strategy in responding to some arguments from evil without endorsing the putative implication that objectors find unacceptable.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-012-9358-1