Skeptical theism and value judgments
One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue th...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2012
|
In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 72, Issue: 1, Pages: 27-39 |
Further subjects: | B
All things considered value
B problem of evil B Skeptical theism |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Electronic
|
MARC
LEADER | 00000naa a22000002 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | 1821413768 | ||
003 | DE-627 | ||
005 | 20221110052715.0 | ||
007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 221110s2012 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s11153-012-9358-1 |2 doi | |
035 | |a (DE-627)1821413768 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)KXP1821413768 | ||
040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
041 | |a eng | ||
084 | |a 0 |2 ssgn | ||
100 | 1 | |a Anderson, David James |e VerfasserIn |4 aut | |
109 | |a Anderson, David James | ||
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Skeptical theism and value judgments |
264 | 1 | |c 2012 | |
336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | |a One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue that it is not problematic. I think that there is reason to question the implication itself. I begin by explaining the objection to skeptical theism and the standard response to it. I then identify an assumption that is prevalent in much of the literature concerning the problem of evil, and show that it is a factor in motivating commitment to the implication I mean to question. I argue that the assumption is false, and that once it is rejected there is room to endorse the skeptical theist’s strategy in responding to some arguments from evil without endorsing the putative implication that objectors find unacceptable. | ||
650 | 4 | |a All things considered value | |
650 | 4 | |a Skeptical theism | |
650 | 4 | |a problem of evil | |
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t International journal for philosophy of religion |d Dordrecht : Springer Nature B.V, 1970 |g 72(2012), 1, Seite 27-39 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)320442098 |w (DE-600)2005049-5 |w (DE-576)103746927 |x 1572-8684 |7 nnns |
773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:72 |g year:2012 |g number:1 |g pages:27-39 |
776 | |i Erscheint auch als |n elektronische Ausgabe |w (DE-627)1646894995 |k Electronic | ||
856 | |3 Volltext |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/23258357 |x JSTOR | ||
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9358-1 |x Resolving-System |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
935 | |a mteo | ||
951 | |a AR | ||
ELC | |a 1 | ||
ITA | |a 1 |t 1 | ||
LOK | |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 | ||
LOK | |0 001 4208217774 | ||
LOK | |0 003 DE-627 | ||
LOK | |0 004 1821413768 | ||
LOK | |0 005 20221110052715 | ||
LOK | |0 008 221110||||||||||||||||ger||||||| | ||
LOK | |0 035 |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-09-28#8A4F8DA124FE85FEBFB13EF0B8E8B914D3B87C13 | ||
LOK | |0 040 |a DE-Tue135 |c DE-627 |d DE-Tue135 | ||
LOK | |0 092 |o n | ||
LOK | |0 852 |a DE-Tue135 | ||
LOK | |0 852 1 |9 00 | ||
LOK | |0 866 |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/23258357 | ||
LOK | |0 935 |a ixzs |a ixrk |a zota | ||
ORI | |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw | ||
REL | |a 1 | ||
SUB | |a REL |