The moral obligations of reasonable non-believers

People who do not believe that there is a God constitute an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands. This makes it hard to see how a divine command...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Morriston, Wes (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2009
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2009, Volume: 65, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-10
Further subjects:B Morality
B Obligation
B Command
B Divine
B Metaethics
B God
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Summary:People who do not believe that there is a God constitute an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands. This makes it hard to see how a divine command theory can offer a completely general account of the nature of moral obligation. The present paper takes a close look at this issue as it emerges in the context of the most recent version of Robert Adams’ modified divine command theory. I argue that, despite a valiant attempt to do so, Adams does not succeed in giving an adequate account of the moral obligations of non-believers. More generally, I claim that if divine commands are construed as genuine speech acts, theists are well advised not to adopt a divine command theory.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-008-9173-x