The skeptic, the content externalist, and the theist
Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is tha...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2011
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Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2011, Volume: 69, Numéro: 3, Pages: 173-180 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Philosophie de l'esprit
B Theism B Content externalism B Epistemological skepticism B philosophy of language |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Édition parallèle: | Électronique
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Résumé: | Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is that such a strong consequence is not desirable for the content-externalists, and that the availability of this argument therefore casts doubt on the anti-skeptical position. I argue that all content externalists should be troubled by this result, since even those philosophers who do not endorse the anti-skeptical strategy must either reject the possibility of a creationist god or admit that their thesis does not hold a priori for minds in general. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-010-9261-6 |