Surviving resurrection
In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constit...
| VerfasserInnen: | ; |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2010
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2010, Band: 67, Heft: 3, Seiten: 123-139 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Resurrection
B Persons B Metaphysics B Lynne Rudder Baker B Constitution B Personal Identity |
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Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-009-9222-0 |