Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?
Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for God’s permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribu...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2005
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2005, Volume: 57, Issue: 1, Pages: 35-66 |
| Further subjects: | B
Natural Evil
B Prior Conviction B Moral Evil B Idiosyncratic Conception B Contemporary Discussion |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Electronic
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| Summary: | Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for God’s permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-004-5895-6 |