All too skeptical theism
Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence....
Published in: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2010
|
In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2010, Volume: 68, Issue: 1, Pages: 15-29 |
Further subjects: | B
Evidential argument from evil
B Unjustified evil B Skeptical theism B moral skepticism B Inductive skepticism |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Electronic
|
Summary: | Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-010-9252-7 |