Immortality and boredom: a response to Wisnewski

This article contributes to the ongoing debate initiated by Bernard Williams’ claim that, due to the non-contingent finitude of the categorical desires that give meaning to our lives, an immortal life would necessarily become intolerably boring. Jeremy Wisnewski has argued that even if immortality i...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Burley, Mikel (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2009
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2009, Volume: 65, Issue: 2, Pages: 77-85
Further subjects:B Immortality
B Death
B Boredom
B Bernard Williams
B J. Jeremy Wisnewski
B Desires
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Parallel Edition:Electronic
Description
Summary:This article contributes to the ongoing debate initiated by Bernard Williams’ claim that, due to the non-contingent finitude of the categorical desires that give meaning to our lives, an immortal life would necessarily become intolerably boring. Jeremy Wisnewski has argued that even if immortality involves periods in which our categorical desires have been exhausted, this need not divest life of meaning since some categorical desires are revivable. I argue that careful reflection upon the thought-experiments adduced by Wisnewski reveals that they do not substantiate his proposal, and hence that a plausible reason for rejecting Williams’ position has not been provided.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-008-9181-x