Customary Practices as Exigencies in Islamic Law: Between a Source of Law and a Legal Maxim
Abstract I offer a corrective to Libson’s view that customs made their way into Islamic law in the formative period only through the ḥadīth and ijmāʿ genres. I argue that custom was incorporated into the law through the legal methodologies of Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik. Due to the success of al-Shāfiʿī’s...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
2018
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In: |
Oriens
Year: 2018, Volume: 46, Issue: 1/2, Pages: 222-261 |
Further subjects: | B
practice of Medina
B social custom B Custom B judicial custom B legal maxims |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Abstract I offer a corrective to Libson’s view that customs made their way into Islamic law in the formative period only through the ḥadīth and ijmāʿ genres. I argue that custom was incorporated into the law through the legal methodologies of Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik. Due to the success of al-Shāfiʿī’s thesis, later jurists justified custom on grounds of necessity and exigency of the times rather than elevating it to the level of the four-source theory of Islamic law. Essential to this process of valorization of custom was a legal maxim developed by al-Juwaynī in the classical period. |
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ISSN: | 1877-8372 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Oriens
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/18778372-04601007 |