Conferred Rights and the Fetus
Bypassing the question of when "human" life begins, the author seeks to determine the moral status of the fetus directly by means of a rational theory of rights. He argues that all agents with an operative rational and moral capacity are entitled to full equal rights, while the rights of t...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1974
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In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Year: 1974, Volume: 2, Issue: 1, Pages: 55-75 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Bypassing the question of when "human" life begins, the author seeks to determine the moral status of the fetus directly by means of a rational theory of rights. He argues that all agents with an operative rational and moral capacity are entitled to full equal rights, while the rights of those lacking these capacities are conferred by rational, moral agents. After reviewing the general considerations that would lead rational agents to confer rights, the author concludes that these agents would probably not choose to restrict their liberty of abortion by conferring substantial rights on the fetus. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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