Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues

Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics when treating moral virtue. Less often do philosophers consider that Aquinas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the functional character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicating...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Inglis, John (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publié: 1999
Dans: Journal of religious ethics
Année: 1999, Volume: 27, Numéro: 1, Pages: 3-27
Sujets non-standardisés:B William Peraldus
B Aquinas
B Virtue
B infused
B Martyrdom
B fortitude
B Dominican
Accès en ligne: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Résumé:Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics when treating moral virtue. Less often do philosophers consider that Aquinas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the functional character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicating each of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level. The author suggests that we can discern reasons for this move by examining Aquinas's commentary on the Sententiae of Peter the Lombard and the Summa theologiae within their historical context. The author's thesis is that Dominican pastoral and intellectual concerns led Aquinas to argue that moral virtue must necessarily be ordered toward the highest good. Understanding this purpose helps to explain his presentation of moral virtue and its implications for standard philosophical interpretations of his work.
ISSN:1467-9795
Contient:Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/0384-9694.00003