Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness
It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
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Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2013
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In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Jahr: 2013, Band: 41, Heft: 3, Seiten: 495-512 |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Forgiveness
B Resentment B Victims B Reactive attitudes B Norms B wrongdoers |
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Parallele Ausgabe: | Elektronisch
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Zusammenfassung: | It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third-party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12026 |