Reasons for Resisting Darwinism, and Why They Should Not Be Credited

Plantinga argues that Darwinism implies that we cannot help adopting our apparently reflective beliefs, and that this is a reason for rejecting Darwinism. I argue that similar arguments apparently apply to the beliefs crucial to deliberation, meaningful work, meaningful relationships, meaningful com...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Attfield, Robin 1931- (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: De Gruyter 2021
Dans: Open theology
Année: 2021, Volume: 7, Numéro: 1, Pages: 129-139
Sujets non-standardisés:B deterministic Darwinism
B Deliberation
B Karl Popper
B Meaningful Work
B Mary Midgley’s account of evolution
B Alvin Plantinga
B human communication
B non-deterministic Darwinism
B theistic evolution
B meaningful relationships
B Creativity
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Résumé:Plantinga argues that Darwinism implies that we cannot help adopting our apparently reflective beliefs, and that this is a reason for rejecting Darwinism. I argue that similar arguments apparently apply to the beliefs crucial to deliberation, meaningful work, meaningful relationships, meaningful communication and creativity. But these arguments apply to deterministic versions of Darwinism only. Cogent non-deterministic versions have been propounded by Popper, Rose, Lewontin, Ward and Miller (those of Ward and Miller being theistic versions). These versions are presented, as is Midgley’s account of how evolution has endowed us with a mix of desires that prepare the way for choice. Plantinga-type arguments pose no problem for such non-deterministic Darwinisms.
ISSN:2300-6579
Contient:Enthalten in: Open theology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1515/opth-2020-0153