Richard Cartwright on Logic and the Trinity
It is often maintained that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity implies a contradiction. It is sometimes maintained that if the doctrine is formulated in a way consonant with the thesis that "identity is always relative to a sortal term," it can be shown that it does not involve a contradicti...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
2022
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Dans: |
TheoLogica
Année: 2022, Volume: 6, Numéro: 2, Pages: 112-135 |
RelBib Classification: | KAJ Époque contemporaine NBC Dieu VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Trinity
B Relativity of identity B Peter Geach B Formal contradiction B Richard Cartwright |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Résumé: | It is often maintained that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity implies a contradiction. It is sometimes maintained that if the doctrine is formulated in a way consonant with the thesis that "identity is always relative to a sortal term," it can be shown that it does not involve a contradiction. Richard Cartwright has contended that an appeal to "the relativity of identity" cannot change the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent with a principle that is "evident to the natural light of reason," namely If every A is a B, then there cannot be fewer B’s than A’s. The purpose of this essay is to examine and evaluate that contention. |
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ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v6i2.63893 |