Contractualism, exclusionary reasons and the moral argument for theism
Moral reasons take precedence over non-moral reasons either by outweighing non-moral practical reasons, or by excluding such reasons. Several prominent defenders of the moral argument for theism have incorporated the outweighing thesis. They claim we have categorically binding moral duties only if w...
| Published in: | Religious studies |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2023
|
| In: |
Religious studies
|
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Moral proof of God's existence
/ Social contract
/ Moral necessity
|
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Further subjects: | B
Scanlon
B exclusionary reasons B moral argument for theism B moral duties B Contractualism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Moral reasons take precedence over non-moral reasons either by outweighing non-moral practical reasons, or by excluding such reasons. Several prominent defenders of the moral argument for theism have incorporated the outweighing thesis. They claim we have categorically binding moral duties only if we always have most reason to be ethical. Furthermore, we always have most reason to be ethical only if theism is true. On the contrary, I argue that the excluding reasons thesis is correct and that this undermines a key premise in moral arguments developed by C. Stephen Evans, C. Stephen Layman, and William Lane Craig. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412521000561 |