Understanding the memory advantage of counterintuitive concepts
Previous work suggests that concepts that are only slightly counterintuitive are more memorable than concepts that are intuitive or overly counterintuitive (Boyer, 1994; Boyer & Ramble, 2001), although causes for this memory advantage have been debated (Barrett, 2008; Upal, 2009). We conducted f...
| Published in: | Religion, brain & behavior |
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| Authors: | ; ; |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Routledge
2012
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| In: |
Religion, brain & behavior
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| Further subjects: | B
Integration
B elaboration B processing time B minimally counterintuitiveness effect |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Previous work suggests that concepts that are only slightly counterintuitive are more memorable than concepts that are intuitive or overly counterintuitive (Boyer, 1994; Boyer & Ramble, 2001), although causes for this memory advantage have been debated (Barrett, 2008; Upal, 2009). We conducted four experiments to better understand the cognitive processes that underlie memory for counterintuitive concepts by recording both reading time and recall of intuitive and counterintuitive statements. Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that additional time spent processing material facilitates memory performance, even if that material is intuitive. However, the results from Experiments 3 and 4 indicate that time alone does not account for the memory advantage previously observed. The implications of the results are discussed. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-5981 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religion, brain & behavior
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/2153599X.2012.672816 |