Good is overrated: on negative altruism as normative foundation for antitheism
In this article, I want to demonstrate the possibility of a normative theory which, if true, would make it impossible to think of God as morally good and therefore would "disqualify" him as God. I call this theory negative altruism (NA) and regard it as the true basis of social morality, a...
Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
2022
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In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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Further subjects: | B
Atheism
B antitheism B Altruism B Good and evil B Normative ethics |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In this article, I want to demonstrate the possibility of a normative theory which, if true, would make it impossible to think of God as morally good and therefore would "disqualify" him as God. I call this theory negative altruism (NA) and regard it as the true basis of social morality, as well as the appropriate normative foundation of antitheism. The article is structured as follows: first, I clarify some basic notions I proceed from (such as antithe-ism, axiological atheism and normative pluralism), second, I describe the normative logic of NA, and then I show why it makes impossible to present any theoretically conceivable creator of this universe as morally good. Lastly, after some remarks on why I find NA preferable to alternative normative theories, I explain in which sense it leads to antitheism. |
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Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3660 |