Good is overrated: on negative altruism as normative foundation for antitheism

In this article, I want to demonstrate the possibility of a normative theory which, if true, would make it impossible to think of God as morally good and therefore would "disqualify" him as God. I call this theory negative altruism (NA) and regard it as the true basis of social morality, a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Seregin, Andrei (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham 2022
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2022, Volume: 14, Issue: 4, Pages: 217-236
Further subjects:B Atheism
B antitheism
B Altruism
B Good and evil
B Normative ethics
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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