The Argument from Reason and the Dual Process Reply

The argument from reason states that if naturalism is true, then our beliefs are caused by physical processes rather than being causally based in their reasons, so our beliefs are not knowledge—including the belief in naturalism itself. Recent critics of the argument from reason provide dual process...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophia Christi
Main Author: Moore, Dwayne (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Evangelical Philosophical Society 2022
In: Philosophia Christi
Year: 2022, Volume: 24, Issue: 2, Pages: 217-239
RelBib Classification:VA Philosophy
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Summary:The argument from reason states that if naturalism is true, then our beliefs are caused by physical processes rather than being causally based in their reasons, so our beliefs are not knowledge—including the belief in naturalism itself. Recent critics of the argument from reason provide dual process replies to the argument from reason—our beliefs can have both a naturalistic cause/ explanation and be caused/explained by its reasons, thereby showing that naturalism can accommodate knowledge. In this paper I consider three dual process replies and conclude that none of them are successful
ISSN:2640-2580
Contains:Enthalten in: Philosophia Christi
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.5840/pc202224220