Explaining Epistemic Intuitions: From Intuitionist Particularism to Intuitionist Explanationism

In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular bel...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for the study of skepticism
Main Author: McCain, Kevin 1980- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2023
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Further subjects:B Miner
B Particularism
B Explanationism
B Problem of the Criterion
B Skepticism
B Intuition
B Phenomenal Explanationism
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Summary:In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There are two general problems for Bergmann’s response to skepticism. First, he fails to accurately portray the key principle of the skeptical argument. As a result, much of the apparent motivation for looking to intuitionist particularism as opposed to other responses to skepticism is merely apparent. Second, intuitionist particularism faces significant problems when it comes to the Problem of the Criterion and the resolution of conflicting intuitions. However, a related intuitionist method, one incorporating explanationism, may be able to deliver what intuitionist particularism promises while avoiding its problems.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10045