Moral knowledge and the existence of god

In this essay, I argue that, all else being equal, theism is more probable than naturalism on the assumption that human beings are able to arrive at a body of moral knowledge that is largely accurate and complete. I put forth this thesis on grounds that, if naturalism is true, the explanation of the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: McKay, Noah D. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2023
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2023, Volume: 94, Issue: 1, Pages: 25-42
Further subjects:B Moral Realism
B Ethics
B Theism
B Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
B moral skepticism
B Natural Theology
B Metaethics
B Theistic arguments
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Description
Summary:In this essay, I argue that, all else being equal, theism is more probable than naturalism on the assumption that human beings are able to arrive at a body of moral knowledge that is largely accurate and complete. I put forth this thesis on grounds that, if naturalism is true, the explanation of the content of our moral intuitions terminates either in biological-evolutionary processes or in social conventions adopted for pragmatic reasons; that, if this is so, our moral intuitions were selected for their utility, not their truth; and that, if our moral intuitions were so selected, they are probably false. I defend the argument against three objections: first, that the argument amounts to a generic skeptical challenge; second, that ethical naturalism explains how our moral intuitions could have been selected for their truth; and third, that there is a pre-established harmony between the utility of moral beliefs and their truth-values.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-023-09868-z