Cognitive Science of Religion, Reliability, and Perceiving God
Matthew Braddock’s argument from false god beliefs (AFG) is one of the most significant debunking arguments to emerge from the growing literature on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This argument aims to produce a defeater for any basic theistic belief. In this essay, I reply to AFG by defending...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Routledge
2023
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| In: |
Theology and science
Year: 2023, Volume: 21, Issue: 3, Pages: 520-543 |
| RelBib Classification: | AE Psychology of religion |
| Further subjects: | B
Epistemology
B cognitive science of religion B epistemic defeat B Reliability B Debunking |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Matthew Braddock’s argument from false god beliefs (AFG) is one of the most significant debunking arguments to emerge from the growing literature on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This argument aims to produce a defeater for any basic theistic belief. In this essay, I reply to AFG by defending a counter-example to AFG’s crucial premise. In particular, I argue that the cognitive mechanisms posited by CSR do not “significantly contribute” to perceptually based theistic belief formation in the way that AFG claims. As a result, a large class of basic theistic beliefs remains undefeated in the face of AFG. |
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| ISSN: | 1474-6719 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Theology and science
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2023.2230436 |