For the Sake of Ourself: Eudaimonism, Friendship, and the Problem of Proprietary Beatitude
In this article, I defend Thomistic eudaimonism against John Hare's Kantian charge of unacceptable self-regard, and argue that Hare's own Scotistic-Kantian double-source theory of motivation introduces a problematic conception of beatitude. Hare argues that the beatitude which motivates th...
| Published in: | Studies in Christian ethics |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Sage
2023
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| In: |
Studies in Christian ethics
Year: 2023, Volume: 36, Issue: 3, Pages: 582-603 |
| RelBib Classification: | KAE Church history 900-1300; high Middle Ages KAJ Church history 1914-; recent history NBE Anthropology NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Friendship
B Eudaimonism B Aquinas B Scotus B Solidarity B Moral Motivation B Beatitude B Kant |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In this article, I defend Thomistic eudaimonism against John Hare's Kantian charge of unacceptable self-regard, and argue that Hare's own Scotistic-Kantian double-source theory of motivation introduces a problematic conception of beatitude. Hare argues that the beatitude which motivates the will in Thomistic eudaimonism is a self-indexed good, which cannot motivate truly altruistic action. Hare fails to recognize that the beatitude that ultimately motivates the human will according to Thomas can be an ‘ourself-indexed’ rather than merely a ‘myself-indexed’ good, as the love of friendship brings other selves into the will's self-intention, facilitating a truly intersubjective and communal beatitude. Rejecting beatitude as the sole motivation of the will, Hare proposes a Scotistic double-source theory of motivation where the beatitude of another and the agent's own beatitude can never be loved with one and the same affection of the will, rendering beatitude unacceptably exclusive and proprietary. By making this argument, I hope to show that contemporary debates concerning moral motivation should carefully consider whether they can account for the intersubjective beatitude that bolsters human solidarity and forms the object of hope given by Christ who wills that his joy may be in us. |
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| ISSN: | 0953-9468 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/09539468231164331 |