Ignorance, Frailty, and Defiance: The Anxiety of Freedom
Interpretations of Vigilius Haufniensis’ analysis of anxiety in the literature can be mainly classified into two models. One holds that anxiety is a phenomenological companion to freedom, whereas the other explains it through the phenomenon of frailty or volitional weakness. Curiously, however, scho...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
De Gruyter
2024
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| In: |
Kierkegaard studies. Yearbook
Year: 2024, Volume: 29, Issue: 1, Pages: 127-146 |
| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropology TJ Modern history VA Philosophy ZD Psychology |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Interpretations of Vigilius Haufniensis’ analysis of anxiety in the literature can be mainly classified into two models. One holds that anxiety is a phenomenological companion to freedom, whereas the other explains it through the phenomenon of frailty or volitional weakness. Curiously, however, scholars holding one model rarely mention the other. I suggest that this results in a partial understanding of Haufniensis’ concept of anxiety. Building on these two popular models, I argue for a more holistic reading that anxiety is rooted in the human’s structural freedom that is not absolute but limited, qualified by three conditions of evil—ignorance, the possibility of frailty, and the possibility of defiance. |
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| ISSN: | 1612-9792 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Kierkegaard studies. Yearbook
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2024-0007 |