Instrumental Needs: A Relational Account

Instrumentalism about need suggests that the normative significance of an agent’s need for x depends on the end for which x is needed. Instrumental accounts have, however, been vague about the transfer or transmission of normative significance supposed to be occurring from ends to needs. How should...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Stabell, Espen Dyrnes (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2024
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2024, Volume: 27, Issue: 4, Pages: 601-617
RelBib Classification:NCC Social ethics
NCD Political ethics
VA Philosophy
ZA Social sciences
Further subjects:B Instrumentalism
B Philosophy of need
B Normative transmission
B Pro tanto reasons
B Basic needs
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Description
Summary:Instrumentalism about need suggests that the normative significance of an agent’s need for x depends on the end for which x is needed. Instrumental accounts have, however, been vague about the transfer or transmission of normative significance supposed to be occurring from ends to needs. How should such transmission be understood, and how can we assess the amount or degree of significance being transmitted in particular cases? The Relational Account (RA) combines work on normative transmission principles and the strength of reasons in order to clarify these issues. RA, it is argued, both (1) improves the instrumental view on need and (2) can be used to analyze and assess a large range of needs and arguments from need - including ‘basic needs’, which some argue require non-instrumental explanation. While the paper develops an instrumental view, the analysis of the normativity of the needs-end relation will also be helpful for clarifying instrumental relations between different kinds of need in non-instrumentalist theories - such as relations between ‘absolute’ and intermediate needs.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-024-10453-0