A Grammatical Investigation of Miracles
Wittgenstein claims that religious belief does not stand on evidence, that only those with a religious point of view can see an event as a miracle, and that experiencing a miracle can influence a person towards religious belief. This has the unusual outcome that a miracle can lead a person to God, b...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
Religions
Year: 2025, Volume: 16, Issue: 2 |
| Further subjects: | B
Miracles
B Religious Belief B Grammar B Religious Language B Wittgenstein |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Wittgenstein claims that religious belief does not stand on evidence, that only those with a religious point of view can see an event as a miracle, and that experiencing a miracle can influence a person towards religious belief. This has the unusual outcome that a miracle can lead a person to God, but a miracle cannot be evidence of God. This also faces two challenges. First, if miracles can only be seen from a religious point of view, then suggesting that a miracle can influence a person towards religion implies that a person can see a miracle before having a religious point of view. Second, if religious belief is not based on evidence, then those who report believing because of evidence are confused about their beliefs in a way we would not expect. I argue that these are not challenges to Wittgenstein’s account but symptoms of our misunderstanding of grammar and his distinction between relative and absolute miracles. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel16020154 |
