Limits on god, freedom for humans
My plan has three parts. First, I address the concern that the problem between divine foreknowledge and free will is merely a pseudo-problem, arguing that it remains philosophically serious and warrants attention. To support this case, I consider Dennett’s dismissal of the divine foreknowledge-freed...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2025, Volume: 98, Issue: 1/2, Pages: 187-207 |
| Further subjects: | B
Free Will
B Omniscience B Eternity B Divine Foreknowledge B Prophesy B Van Inwagen |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | My plan has three parts. First, I address the concern that the problem between divine foreknowledge and free will is merely a pseudo-problem, arguing that it remains philosophically serious and warrants attention. To support this case, I consider Dennett’s dismissal of the divine foreknowledge-freedom problem, arguing that this dismissal is too hasty. Second, I argue that the eternity solution popularized by Stump and Kretzmann, and later defended by Rogers, Rota, Timpe, Diekemper, De Florio, and Frigerio, fails to respond to van Inwagen’s Freedom-Denying Prophetic Object thought experiment. Additionally, I offer an alternative explanation to van Inwagen’s for why even the mere possibility of divine prophecy threatens free will. Third, I defend van Inwagen’s limited foreknowledge approach by responding to recent critiques from Todd and Arbour and by addressing a uniquely Christian concern regarding Jesus as a freedom-denying prophetic object. The defense is not intended to defeat Todd and Arbour’s objections but only to neutralize them. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-025-09967-z |
