On the incoherence of Molinism: incompatibility of the single act of will with divine providence
In this paper, I argue that Molinism’s two basic principles—God’s single act of will and divine providence—are incompatible. To this end, I first distinguish between general and special providence. According to the former, God guides the universe and all creatures as a whole, whereas the latter affi...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
2025
|
| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2025, Volume: 98, Numéro: 1/2, Pages: 75-85 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Molinism
B Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom B Divine Providence B Incoherency B Divine temporality B The single act of will |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | In this paper, I argue that Molinism’s two basic principles—God’s single act of will and divine providence—are incompatible. To this end, I first distinguish between general and special providence. According to the former, God guides the universe and all creatures as a whole, whereas the latter affirms that God cares for every individual creature and has specific plans for each one. In the next step, I argue that Molinism ascribes special providence to God. Then, I try to indicate that, according to the Molinist account, God exercises His special providence through the single act of will. In the following, I demonstrate that assuming counterfactuals of freedom in divine knowledge does entail God experiencing ‘temporal succession’. As a result, contrary to the widely accepted claim, the Molinist God is temporal. Finally, I argue that assuming a single act of will for a temporal God leads us to reject divine special providence because the assumption of such a will for a temporal God implies that He cares for His creatures only at a certain time, whereas a provident God must always care for them. Therefore, the Molinist God is not a provident being. I conclude that Molinism is incoherent. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-025-09960-6 |
