Richard Joyce’s Argument by Elimination for Moral Error Theory
In Morality: From Error to Fiction, Richard Joyce argues that ordinary moral discourse is committed to the existence of ontologically robust moral facts, on the basis that ordinary speakers consider moral belief to be a sincerity condition of moral judgement. I object to this argument, on the basis...
| Subtitles: | Symposium on Richard Joyces Morality |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2025, Volume: 15, Issue: 4, Pages: 269-281 |
| Further subjects: | B
Belief
B Noncognitivism B Minimalism B Error Theory B Metaethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In Morality: From Error to Fiction, Richard Joyce argues that ordinary moral discourse is committed to the existence of ontologically robust moral facts, on the basis that ordinary speakers consider moral belief to be a sincerity condition of moral judgement. I object to this argument, on the basis that it seems likely that ordinary speakers associate moral judgements with minimal moral beliefs rather than robust moral beliefs - and minimal moral beliefs are not ontologically committing. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10115 |
