Some Properties of Immediate Judgements in Islamic Philosophy from Avicenna to Jurjānī
Philosophers of the Islamic world developed an extensive theory of immediate judgements (badīhiyyāt), viz., those judgements known to be true independent of reasoning (fikr). They posed and answered several questions: How does immediate knowledge come to be in the mind? Is it possible to mistake an...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
Oriens
Year: 2025, Volume: 53, Issue: 1/2, Pages: 36-78 |
| Further subjects: | B
First principles
B Epistemology B A priori B Intuition B Post-classical |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Philosophers of the Islamic world developed an extensive theory of immediate judgements (badīhiyyāt), viz., those judgements known to be true independent of reasoning (fikr). They posed and answered several questions: How does immediate knowledge come to be in the mind? Is it possible to mistake an immediate judgement for a mediate judgement - be it true or false - and vice versa? If so, are there ways to distinguish between them? How is it possible that skeptics deny immediate judgements in the first place? Must there be consensus on all immediate judgements? Can one always know immediately that a judgement is immediate? Or can one instead sometimes prove that an immediate judgement is in fact immediate? After a review of some of the tradition’s responses to these and other questions, the article concludes with a list summarizing some important properties of immediate judgements. |
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| ISSN: | 1877-8372 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Oriens
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/18778372-12340041 |
