An epistemic argument for tolerance

In this paper I first take a critical look at Grube’s allegiance to the idea that bivalence should be rejected as it can serve the cause of religious toleration. I argue that bivalence is not what Grube says it is, and that rejection of bivalence comes at a very high price that we should not be will...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal of philosophy and theology
Main Author: Woudenberg, René van 1957- (Author)
Format: Electronic/Print Article
Language:English
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Published: Taylor & Francis [2016]
In: International journal of philosophy and theology
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Religion / Justification (Philosophy) / Religious tolerance / Bi-valence
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
AX Inter-religious relations
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:In this paper I first take a critical look at Grube’s allegiance to the idea that bivalence should be rejected as it can serve the cause of religious toleration. I argue that bivalence is not what Grube says it is, and that rejection of bivalence comes at a very high price that we should not be willing to pay. Next I analyze Grube’s argument for religious toleration - an argument that does not involve the rejection of bivalence. I argue that the argument is unconvincing because there exists no relation between epistemic justification and toleration. (I also note problems with the notion of "justification" as used by Grube.)
ISSN:2169-2327
Reference:Kritik von "Justified religious difference (2016)"
Kritik in "Reply to the respondents to "Justified religious difference: a constructive approach to religious diversity" (2016)"
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2015.1133315