P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism
This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the core assumption: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the...
Publié dans: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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Auteur principal: | |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Brill
2017
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Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2017, Volume: 7, Numéro: 1, Pages: 26-52 |
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Strawson, Peter Frederick 1919-2006
/ Libre arbitre
/ Naturalisme (Philosophie)
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Sujets non-standardisés: | B
P. F. Strawson
skepticism
naturalism
free will
moral responsibility
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Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Résumé: | This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the core assumption: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of criticisms based on the core assumption. Strawson’s critiques of incompatibilism and free will skepticism are not intended to provide rational justifications for either compatibilism or the claim that some persons have free will. Hence, the charge that Strawson’s “arguments” are faulty is misplaced. The core assumption resting behind such critiques is mistaken. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contient: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-006011220 |