Naturalism and the Error Theory
Bart Streumer makes an interesting case for an error theory in ethics—and for an error theory for normativity more generally, but I will focus on the more restricted target. I offer a reply on behalf of naturalists (reductionists, reductive realists) in ethics. My case for resistance will involve id...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2018]
|
| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2018, Volume: 8, Issue: 4, Pages: 270-281 |
| Further subjects: | B
reference of moral terms
B Cognitivism B Error Theory B Naturalism B Reductionism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Bart Streumer makes an interesting case for an error theory in ethics—and for an error theory for normativity more generally, but I will focus on the more restricted target. I offer a reply on behalf of naturalists (reductionists, reductive realists) in ethics. My case for resistance will involve identifying a three-fold ambiguity in his use of the term ‘guarantee'. I conclude with some observations about the implications of theories of reference for moral/ethical terms for the debate. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "Précis of Unbelievable Errors (2018)"
Kritik in "Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder (2018)" |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181302 |
