Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder
I argue that Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder's objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. I also argue that our inability to believe the error theory should affect our assessments of these arguments.
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
[2018]
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2018, Volume: 8, Issue: 4, Pages: 322-341 |
Further subjects: | B
Belief
B Non-cognitivism B Error Theory B non-reductive realism B reductive realism |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | I argue that Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder's objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. I also argue that our inability to believe the error theory should affect our assessments of these arguments. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Reference: | Kritik von "Willing Belief (2018)"
Kritik von "Necessarily Coextensive Predicates and Reduction (2018)" Kritik von "Naturalism and the Error Theory (2018)" |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181352 |