Willing Belief
In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer offers resourceful arguments against each of non-reductive realism, reductive realism, and non-cognitivism, in order to motivate his version of the normative error theory, according to which normative predicates ascribe properties that do not exist. In this cont...
Published in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
[2018]
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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Further subjects: | B
Reduction
B Non-cognitivism B Error Theory B supervenience B Bart Streumer |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer offers resourceful arguments against each of non-reductive realism, reductive realism, and non-cognitivism, in order to motivate his version of the normative error theory, according to which normative predicates ascribe properties that do not exist. In this contribution, I argue that none of the steps of this master argument succeed, and that Streumer's arguments leave puzzles about what it means to ascribe a property at all. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Reference: | Kritik von "Précis of Unbelievable Errors (2018)"
Kritisiert in "Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder (2018)" |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181327 |