Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence

Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to belie...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for the study of skepticism
Main Author: Frederick, Danny (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2013
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2013, Volume: 3, Issue: 1, Pages: 24-44
Further subjects:B Alston belief doubt doxastic voluntarism knowledge scepticism Williams
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)

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