Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence
Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to belie...
| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
2013
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2013, Band: 3, Heft: 1, Seiten: 24-44 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Alston
belief
doubt
doxastic voluntarism
knowledge
scepticism
Williams
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| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to believe, we are able to rescind that suspension, and thus to choose to believe. I show that the arguments that have been offered against doxastic voluntarism fail; and that, if the denial of doxastic voluntarism is part of a strategy to defeat scepticism, it is inept, because knowledge presupposes doubt. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Enthält: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/221057012X627212 |