Complete Concept Molinism
A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called grounding objection...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 5, Issue: 1, Pages: 93-108 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called grounding objection to molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is a revised form of the traditional essence solution. Inspired by leibnizs idea of a notio completa (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model of possibilistic (molinist) complete concepts. They ground middle knowledge within the very being of the agents themselves. molinist Complete Concepts can thus serve to reject consequence-style arguments against molinism. They also allow the molinist to safeguard a robustly libertarian notion of the ability to do otherwise. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.251 |