Skeptical Theism and Morriston's Humean Argument from Evil
There's a growing sense among philosophers of religion that (i) Humean arguments from evil are some of the most formidable arguments against theism, and (ii) skeptical theism fails to undermine those arguments because they fail to make the inferences skeptical theists criticize. In line with th...
Publié dans: | Sophia |
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Auteur principal: | |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Netherlands
[2019]
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Dans: |
Sophia
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Wes Morriston
B Humean argument from evil B Skeptical theism B Offsetting objection |
Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Résumé: | There's a growing sense among philosophers of religion that (i) Humean arguments from evil are some of the most formidable arguments against theism, and (ii) skeptical theism fails to undermine those arguments because they fail to make the inferences skeptical theists criticize. In line with this trend, Wes Morriston has recently formulated a Humean argument from evil, and his chief defense of it is that skeptical theism is irrelevant to it. Here I argue that skeptical theism is relevant to Humean arguments. To do this, I reveal the common structure of skeptical theism's critiques. Seeing the common structure reveals why some versions of skeptical theism are irrelevant to Humean arguments from evil. It also points the way forward to formulating a relevant version. By combining skeptical theism with a plausible principle concerning reasonable belief, I formulate a version of skeptical theism that undermines Morriston's argument that is also immune from his objections. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-018-0656-7 |