Skepticism as Vice and Virtue
I articulate and defend a conception of skepticism inspired by Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. On it, skepticism is vicious when deficient (as in gullibility) and when excessive (as in closedmindedness). Virtuous skepticism lies as a mean between these two extremes.
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
[2019]
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2019, Volume: 9, Numéro: 3, Pages: 238-260 |
| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
closedmindedness
B Virtue B Gullibility B Skepticism B Vice |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | I articulate and defend a conception of skepticism inspired by Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. On it, skepticism is vicious when deficient (as in gullibility) and when excessive (as in closedmindedness). Virtuous skepticism lies as a mean between these two extremes. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191359 |