Weakness of Will and Practical Identity
In this article, I develop an Augustinian response to some contemporary philosophical proposals concerning the problem of weakness of will. I argue that many philosophers tend to cast the problem in terms of irrationality, focusing on psychological components such as judgment, desire, and resolution...
| Published in: | Studies in Christian ethics |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Sage
[2020]
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| In: |
Studies in Christian ethics
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| RelBib Classification: | KAB Church history 30-500; early Christianity NBE Anthropology VA Philosophy ZD Psychology |
| Further subjects: | B
Augustine
B Irrationality B Weakness of will B Akrasia B Practical identity |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Summary: | In this article, I develop an Augustinian response to some contemporary philosophical proposals concerning the problem of weakness of will. I argue that many philosophers tend to cast the problem in terms of irrationality, focusing on psychological components such as judgment, desire, and resolution. In contrast, I contend that weakness of will has more to do with the absence of a coherent conception of practical identity and with a misleading conception of practical identity that overestimates the agent’s normative and motivational capacities. I claim that the irrationality of the weak-willed agent is at best a symptom, rather than the ultimate source, of weakness of will which cannot be properly understood without first addressing the deficiency of our internal resources relative to our willing and doing. |
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| ISSN: | 0953-9468 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/0953946820909746 |