Knowledge without “Experience”
Genia Schönbaumsfeld argues that Cartesian skepticism is an illusion induced by the “Cartesian Picture” of perceptual knowledge, in which knowledge of the “external world” depends on an inference from how things subjectively seem to one to how they actually are. To show its incoherence, she draws on...
| Publié dans: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2021
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2021, Volume: 11, Numéro: 2, Pages: 119-142 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia 1973-, The illusion of doubt
/ Théorie de la connaissance
/ McDowell, John Henry 1942-, Mind and world
/ Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit
/ Cartésianisme
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Cartesian skepticism
B Perception B Knowledge B Wittgenstein B McDowell |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Genia Schönbaumsfeld argues that Cartesian skepticism is an illusion induced by the “Cartesian Picture” of perceptual knowledge, in which knowledge of the “external world” depends on an inference from how things subjectively seem to one to how they actually are. To show its incoherence, she draws on the work of John McDowell, which she sees as elaborating a central theme from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty . I argue that Cartesian skepticism is not an illusion, as Schönbaumsfeld understands ‘illusion’, and that McDowell’s account of perceptual knowledge is both untenable and incompatible with Wittgenstein’s ideas about knowledge. Schönbaumsfeld thinks that, to understand how perception can engender knowledge of the world, we need a non-Cartesian account of perceptual reasons. Wittgenstein offers a much more radical break with the Cartesian Picture: an account of knowledge without ‘experience’. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20201425 |